EIT: "Isoäidin" käännyttäminen Venäjälle ei loukannut EIS:sta; äänestys jaostossa 8 artiklan soveltuvuudesta

Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuin (EIT) on tänään antamassaan tuomiossa katsonut, että iäkäs henkilö voitiin käännyttää Venäjälle loukkaamatta Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimuksen (EIS) 3 tai 8 artiklaa.

EIS 3 artiklan väitetyn loukkauksen osalta tuomarit olivat yksimielisiä: Venäjällä on riittävät mahdollisuudet saada hoitoa mahdollisiin sairauksiin, eikä pelkästään heikko kunto ja avun tarve ole peruste katsoa, että henkilö joutuisi epäinhimillisen tai halventavan kohtelun kohteeksi.

EIS 8 artiklan osalta enemmistö katsoi, että se ei lainkaan soveltunut tapaukseen. Valitusta arvioitiin toisaalta vain 8 artiklassa suojatun perhe-elämän kannalta, eikä ainakaan tuomion perusteluissa pohdittu lainkaan sitä, tulisiko asiassa tarkastella myös 8 artiklassa suojattu yksityiselämää. Vähemmistö olisi tutkinut valituksen myös 8 artiklan osalta. Ote vähemmistön perusteluista tältä osin:

Apparently the majority did
not deem it appropriate to conduct an analysis of this aspect of the
applicability of Article 8 in similar cases. For us it seems clear that,
in the conditions described in paragraph 5 of the judgment, the present
circumstances required such analysis and we regret that the Court
dismisses this issue by simply noting (see paragraph 46) that “even
assuming that the applicant is dependent on outside help in order to
cope with her daily life”, it is not necessary for such care to be
provided by her daughter or in Finland as “there are both private and
public care institutions in Russia and it is also possible to hire
external help” (which, in the applicant’s view, would risk exposing her
to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention).

Thus,
acknowledging the existence of “normal affection” as one of the
elements pertinent to the applicable test, the majority found the
applicant’s actual dependence (or otherwise) on the everyday loving care
of an adult child to be of no relevance for the applicability of
Article 8. In our understanding this approach fails to take into account
the entirety of the initially indicated applicable principle that “the
existence of ‘family life’ cannot be relied on by applicants in relation
to their elderly parents, adults who do not belong to the core family, unless the latter have been shown to be dependent on the members of their family (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], cited above, § 97)” (see paragraph 55, emphasis added).

The
notion of “core family” and the level of preserved emotional ties
between parents and separated adult children vary across the cultures
and traditions of Europe as well as among individuals living in various
countries. These ties cannot be said to depend on the “regular” or
“irregular” status of one or other member of the wider family circle,
and often vary also in the different periods of their lives regardless
of their place of residence. A time comes when elderly parents do need
the loving care of their adult children and actually receive it as a
matter of moral duty and preserved feelings of affection. To deny this
is to hold that once an individual comes of age, the emotional ties with
his or her parents are to be considered once and for all de facto and de jure
severed and that for this reason neither a moral nor a legal duty to
provide care may be said to exist between them. In our understanding
this is incorrect in both legal and moral terms.

EIT:n lehdistötiedote, missä myös linkki koko tuomioon, löytyy täältä: here